Ike Jumps the Gun on Testing, P. 3

Two U.S. Army Publications Say Russians Do Not Believe in Efficacy of Surprise Attack, See Page 2

I. F. Stone's Weekly

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Not As Open A Society As We're Cracked Up to Be

On the eve of the summit conference, the case of the U-2 and its aftermath have demonstrated that the Soviet Union is a good deal less closed and the United States a good deal less open a society than we had supposed. For four years our reconnaissance planes have been photographing Soviet defense installations with impunity, except for a dozen or so incidents in which planes have been shot down. But for the accident which enabled the Russians to capture the pilot in this latest affair, our government would have gone on lying to us about the shooting down of unarmed civilian planes innocently blundering across Soviet borders while studying the weather. As this is being written Mr. Eisenhower has just told his press conference, "Open societies, in the days of present weapons, are the only answer." In the days of present weapons, when invasion of an opposing country's skies may trigger off disaster, striving for an open society should begin at home. It looks as if we have clearer pictures of Russian bases than we do of the CIA.

How Incidents Lead to Wars

There seem to be no deterrents against the CIA as there are against the Russians. If only the incident created proves serious enough, the CIA can be sure that Congress will "close ranks" and tamp down criticism in order to "strengthen" the President. This is how incidents create wars. It becomes a point of honor "not to back down." The last few days in Congress have again shown how quickly sobriety evaporates in these brink-of-war situations. On Friday, May 6, Lyndon Johnson was still ready to talk sensibly. "Premier Khrushchov," the majority leader told the Senate, "may well have thought the flight of a plane was a deliberate intrusion on our part. If that were even a remote possibility," Johnson added, "we, too, should be taken to task for allowing it just before the summit meeting, or at any other time." But four days later when it was clear that CIA had indeed been guilty of this "remote possibility," Johnson attacked not the CIA but the Russians. Johnson told the Senate Tuesday, May 10, in a speech which brought him a warm handshake from Nixon, that he wanted Khrushchov to know that he could not "use this incident in such a way as to divide the American people," divide them, that is, from Allen Dulles. When Javits of New York hailed this as statesmanship, Johnson modestly insisted "I merely said that America must be all for one and one for all." Why, when one's country most needs clear thinking, is fatuity considered patriotism?

Four years ago the Hoover Commission recommended that Congress establish a "watchdog" committee to supervise CIA activities, but at the very moment of CIA's greatest boner criticism of it was stifled. Even Mansfield of Montana, who has for years been calling for some control over CIA, did not mention it by name when he charged in the Senate on Monday, May 9, that there was need to correct the "dangerous flaws" in the executive branch of the government that create "incidents of this kind." Zablocki *(D. Wis.)* called on the House Rules committee to report out his HJ Res. 31 for the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence Matters, but there was no echo of support in the House. The liberals were numb. As of Wednesday morning, only three Senators and one Congressman (see box this page) had joined Zablocki in criticism of the "tragic blunder." Even the Hearst press criticized the Administration for allowing so dangerous a flight just before the summit meeting but in Congress few dared say this on the floor. Only Robertson of Virginia, a conservative who can get away with it, stated angrily Monday that neither he nor any other member of the select Appropriations subcommittee which has for 13 years passed on the hush-hush CIA budget had ever heard that it operated planes.

The Few in Congress Who Protested

"This incident or any other of this kind might well have accidentally set off the holocaust of nuclear conflict which we have been striving at great cost and sacrifice to prevent."

—Mansfield (D. Mont) in the Senate May 9.

"It was not only a tragic blunder of trying to send a plane across the continent of Russia, but in violating the neutrality of two friendly nations."

—Robertson (D. Va) in the Senate May 9.

"I find it difficult to close ranks behind the President in the case of an accident about which the State Department and the administration say he knew nothing. . . . If he [the President] did not—I say that that fact is a worse indictment than if he had knowledge of it and had approved it."

—McCarthy (D. Minn) in the Senate May 9.

"Mr. Speaker, I am distressed that there are public officials who in this hour preceding a world conference of heads of State would seek to justify or condone provocative acts which threaten the lives of hundreds of millions of people the world over."

—Byron Johnson (D. Col) in the House May 10.

How the Spies Swarmed at Oak Ridge

The Robertson statement makes it difficult to take at face value the cover-up speech in the House next day by Cannon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. "Although the Members of the House have not generally been informed on the subject," Cannon said, "the mission was one of a series and part of an established program with which the subcommittee in charge of the program was famil-

(Continued on Page Four)

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Official Analysis of Soviet Military Strategy Embarrassing to State Department

U.S. Army Publication Says Khrushchov Does Not Believe in Surprise Attack

The State Department excused espionage flights over Soviet territory as necessary to allay "apprehension over surprise attack." A few days earlier, the U.S. Army Information Digest (June issue) published an article, "Soviet Attitudes on the Use of Military Power" which reports that Soviet military doctrine under Khrushchov (as under Stalin) holds to the view that surprise attack cannot win a war. Here are the relevant excerpts:

"The men in the Kremlin, despite their ideological framework, are practical observers of the world scene and base their decisions in the final analysis on what they calculate to be the relative distribution of political, economic and military power. They appreciate fully the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and while seemingly assured of their own strength evidently realize that the U.S.S.R. could not escape damaging counter blows in a war with the United States. This was forthrightly acknowledged in Khrushchov's 14 January speech. The Soviet leader, although claiming that the West 'would suffer incomparably more' in event of a new world war, made the unprecedented admission for him that the U.S.S.R. also 'would suffer great casualties.'

Even Missiles Do Not Change the Picture

"In this connection, the Premier restated caution on the decisiveness of surprise in modern war, a feature of military doctrine to which the Soviets have devoted increased prominence in recent years. Khrushchov declared that the factor of surprise attack with even such formidable weapons as missiles would not achieve victory for the attacker. Although granting that surprise held certain advantages, he noted that it would not enable the aggressor 'to put out of order immediately all the stocks of nuclear weapons, all the rocket installations located on the territory of the power attacked.'

"Khrushchov's remarks are indicative of a strategy aimed at deterring the West, but they are also an avowal that the Soviet Union is itself deterred from courses of action that run risks of general war. . . . Moscow does not appear to be undertaking the extremely expensive task of developing military might capable of eliminating by a first strike the ability of the West to retaliate. Soviet leaders evidently consider it more essential to their longer range power position to fulfill their ambitious economic programs. . . ."

Miscalculation the Real Danger

A leading British authority on Soviet military strategy, writing in the newly published May issue of Army, the organ of the Association of the U.S. Army, also says "there is no evidence from Soviet sources that Moscow is considering a nuclear preventive war." Discussing "Soviet Strategy in World War III," Malcolm Mackintosh thinks it would be more likely to break out from miscalculation. Mr. Mackintosh came to this country in January to lecture before the Air War College.

Meyer and Kastenmeier Challenge Preventive War Doctrine in Defense Budget Debate

Two Democratic members of Congress, Meyer of Vermont, and Kastenmeier of Wisconsin, rose in the House May 5 during debate on the defense budget to challenge the doctrine of pre-emptive war set forth by the House Appropriations Committee in reporting the budget bill. That report, as discussed in our last week's issue, called for the U.S. to strike first "should it ever become obvious that an attack upon us or our allies is imminent." Mr. Meyer called attention to this, and to the colloquy on "preventive war" at page 73 of Part 7 of the appropriations hearings between Mr. Mahon of Texas, chairman of the defense subcommittee, and General Power, head of the Strategic Air Command. In this, Mr. Mahon said we ough to stop "all of this big talk" that we would "under no circumstances more or less start a war," so that we could keep our opponent "on tenterhooks."

Mr. Mahon (p. 8921 Cong. Rec. May 5) said the defense subcommittee which wrote the report had no desire "to endorse a policy of preventive war or so-called pre-emptive war." But," he added, "we do not want to give the opponent complete assurance that we will sit by with folded hands and submit to destruction without raising a finger in our defense." Mr. Mahon nevertheless assured Mr. Meyer there was "no intention whatever of preventive war. That is contrary to our national policy." Then Mr. Meyer read the passage in the defense bill report about "pre-emptive war" and asked "who would decide an attack is imminent? To me that is an enunciation of the principle of pre-emptive war." To this Mr. Mahon made a reply which we believe to be disingenuous. Here it is:

"If an attack is made on us by manned bombers," Mr. Mahon said, "those bombers would have to be in the air for a period of hours before this country could be hit. We have radar screens and early warning lines as well as information overseas in regard to what is going on in the world. If it becomes obvious an attack is being launched or is in the process of being launched on this country, certainly we have the right and plan, I hope, to have our bombers in the air. They can be recalled if necessary. We do not want to have them on the ground subject to destruction by an opposing force. This is a matter of being on the alert."

At this point Mr. Meyer's time was cut off. One would have to be naive to believe that Mr. Mahon was only talking about an alert when he spoke of striking first, and he never did explain his colloquy with General Power. We hope the issue will be discussed more adequately when the Senate takes up the defense budget. After the defense budget was voted with only three nays (Harmon, Ind.; Hechler, W.Va., and Johnson, Col., all Democrats), Mr. Kastenmeier made a short but able speech (p. 8957) in which he quoted the pre-emptive war section of the Mahon report and said:

"The suggestion here made, from which I absolutely disassociate myself, is the suggestion that we must contemplate striking first. It is dangerous in the extreme since it would lead to the situation most frighteningly conducive to accidental war, the situation when each side has the safety catch off and is fingering a hair trigger.

"That trigger, as we all know, will set off dozens of thermonuclear missiles not merely an old-fashioned rifle. The deterrent has always before been considered to be the ability to strike second with power so frightening that it would deter anyone from striking first. Some of us now seem to have moved so far on this deterrent road that the 'deterrent' is seen as the first strike. This shift is clear evidence that the road is the wrong road. A form of defense that would result in universal annihilation is clearly no defense and from this point on it must be clear to us all that the pursuit of universal disarmament is the only real defense."

These were the wisest words of the whole debate.

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Why Did Ike Have to Jump the Gun on Test Resumption While Talks Still Going On?

Why Pentagon and AEC Do Not Want Joint Research on Nuclear Detection

Mr. Eisenhower's announcement that we would soon resume underground testing for detection improvement threw up another obstacle to agreement at Geneva. U.S. agencies do not want joint research on test detection, to which the Russians have agreed. The U.S. agencies want what they call "coordinated" research, in which each nation does it own and allows limited observation by others. The reason was disclosed by Gerald W. Johnson, assistant director of Livermore laboratory, in his testimony before the recent hearings on a test agreement held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Johnson said the Russians wanted joint research in test detection and peacetime uses done on the basis of "systems which we opened up completely", i.e. no secret devices would be used. Johnson said we preferred to use "our more advanced systems", i.e. of nuclear explosives, and added "these are just the systems that we would not want to reveal." "These are just the systems," Chairman Holifield commented, "that would give us more information in weapons technology." To which Johnson replied, "Absolutely." In other words we could use experiments for "peacetime uses" and "detection improvement" as a means of testing for new weapons devices. This explains why Hagerty, as the *New York Times* reported cryptically May 8, "seemed not to rule out the possibility that the knowledge gained might have military applicability."

Tricky Misrepresentation

What will most anger the Russians in the Eisenhower statement is that it said that at Geneva they "concurred" in the proposal that nuclear underground tests be resumed to improve means of detection. The Russians argued that chemical explosions were adequate. Many thoughtful U.S. scientists disagree. The Russians gave in reluctantly, but on the supposition that nuclear tests would be non-secret and under joint auspices. It is true that the President's statement still leaves open the question of "the areas in which coordinated or joint research would be most fruitful" but it took by surprise even our own negotiators waiting in Geneva for talks to resume on May 11. Why was it necessary to jump the gun and issue a unilateral statement on May 7? The Pentagon and the AEC dragged their heels for many months before doing anything about the Berkner panel recommendations for improved detection methods. Now it looks as if they are acting quickly to head off joint research and poison the atmosphere of the talks.

The "summary" released by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy last Monday on its test agreement hearings ran true to expectation, stressing the negative. Its conclusion that "for the next several years at least" it will not be possible "to identify" underground shots below 19 kilotons "although they may be detected" is question-begging. The Berkner panel said a three year program was needed to restore the full effectiveness of the 180-station system agreed upon at Geneva in 1958. A minority report, if the Committee were not lined up solid on the AEC-Pentagon side, would stress that within a few years a greatly improved detection capacity was expected and that event now an attempt to cheat would be dangerous because even small shots can be detected at great distances.

The only thing new in the report was its reference to a supplementary memorandum by Dr. Hans A. Bethe revising downward from 600 to 200 the number of unmanned stations in the Soviet Union required to monitor even 20 kiloton (20,000 tons) shots decoupled by a factor of 300 to look like a mere 70 tons. The Committee said the text would be published with the hearings in June but Senator Proxmire put it in the Congressional Records May 4 where it appears at pages 8689-90. It is must reading.

Dr. Hans Bethe's Warning

"The Russians have got the impression—and I think rightly—that whenever one demand has been fulfilled [in the nuclear testing talks at Geneva], we make another. They have got the impression that we are never satisfied. This is exactly the impression that we got in the Baruch negotiations, in the negotiations directly after the war, about the international control of atomic energy in general. We got the impression that it is impossible to negotiate with the Russians. I think—and I don't know because I don't know the minds of the Russians well enough—I think they are rapidly getting the impression that we are now impossible to negotiate with; that it is impossible to get an agreement which is satisfactory to us, because we insist on a hundred percent security in a world where there is no such security.

"We must watch out very carefully lest the peaceful Russian approach which has been brought in by Mr. Khrushchov be replaced by a more violent line, such as that of Stalin. And I do not know where our hundred percent security would be if that happened."

—Dr. Hans Bethe, speech at the Washington Philosophical Society April 25, from textual excerpt put in Congressional Record May 4 by Senator Proximire.

How the News About Those Police Clashes With Refugees in Berlin Was Faked

THE BERLIN STORY: UPI [United Press International] had a series of dispatches from Berlin this week telling about East German police invading West Berlin 'in a desperate effort to effort a sudden mass flight of refugees,' and clashing with West Berlin police in their hunt for fugitive East Germans on the elevated railway. On their face, the stories told of a critical situation. AP [Associated Press] reported the police incident and the refugee situation separately. We did not connect them because (1) no responsible source, official or press, saw a link and (2) staff observations at border points did not show any unusual activity by Communist police.

"Communist police come into West Berlin every day, hundreds of them, to supervise operation of the elevator, which is East Germany's responsibility. There is a running quarrel between East and West forces over authority on elevated station platforms; the arrest of a couple of East German officers for being out of bounds was part of that quarrel. There were no reports of refugees being molested or intimidated, and West Berlin police are constantly on the alert for such action. As to the refugee flow, there always is an upsurge at Easter—Communist officials are less vigilant then—and it's a human impulse to travel in springtime. The jump was larger than usual this year, because of the land collectivization campaign in East Germany, but it since has dwindled to little more than average."

—AP Log, Associated Press weekly, April 21-27.

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Maybe Ike's Unwelcome Because It's Moscow That Fears A Pearl Harbor

(*Continued from Page One*)

iar, and of which it had been fully apprised during this and previous sessions." Cannon tried to excuse this operation by painting a picture of Soviet espionage in this country so extensive as almost to create a housing problem. "When we were at Oak Ridge," Cannon told the House, "we were told there were so many Russian spies there that only by a policy of strictest compartmentalism were they able to maintain the integrity of their work." In his peroration, Cannon dwelt on "the most gratifying feature of the entire incident." "The world has always recognized the remarkable success of our form of government," Cannon ended triumphantly. "But they have said that it was at a great disadvantage in a war with an authoritarian dictatorship. We have here demonstrated conclusively that free men confronted by the most ruthless and criminal despotism can under the Constitution of the United States protect this nation and preserve world civilization," i.e. we can be just as deceitful.

Bipartisan Brainwash

With Johnson's speech in the Senate and Cannon's in the House last Tuesday the Southern conservative leadership had lined the Democratic party up with the Republican in a bipartisan brainwashing operation. Its purpose is to convince the American people that secret overflights are no different from ordinary espionage, and indeed constitute a kind of benevolent operation to save the world from being confronted by a choice, as the State Department said in its May 9 release, between "abject surrender or nuclear destruction." Madison Avenue has never tried to sell a bigger whopper, though the President himself let a little wind out of the bag by admitting at press conference that there was no evidence of Russian reconnaissance flights over our country. A somewhat contradictory line is also being peddled to the effect that the overflights have been a public benefit by proving that the Russians aren't so well prepared after all. Joseph Alsop, who proved by arithmetic only a few months ago that Russia could wipe out all our bases at home and abroad in one foul blow, now proclaims them virtually helpless to counter American attack from the air. Even for so gifted a whirling dervish, that is quite a turn.

The Trigger-Happy Mentality
The World Fears

"'By all odds,' said Maj. Gen. David Wade, the [Vandenberg ICBM] Base Commander,' the most important aspect of Vandenberg's mission is its growing ability to launch in anger and on a very few minutes notice.'"

—"Missile City Ready to Fight," dispatch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Washington Post, May 8 by John G. Norris, one of the hundred newsmen and associate members of the Aviation Writers Association who toured this, the first operational ICBM base.

The truth is (see documents on page two) that the Russians do not believe in the possibility of winning a war by surprise attack—after all Hitler failed in his surprise attack on them and the Japanese in their surprise attack on us—nor do they have the military means even if they were mad enough to try. To save themselves from retaliation, they would have to hit our bases round the world and open war on half the globe, dousing the northern hemisphere with so much fallout as possibly to endanger themselves as well. This fixation about surprise attack is a psychosis nurtured by the Air Force which still believes in the possibility of pushbutton victory by airpower. The Air Force is wedded to a counter-force strategy, that is to building up the means to strike first and wage preventive or pre-emptive war. But this it cannot do without knowing the location of Russia's retaliatory bases which would have to be wiped out in the first blow. Taber of New York indicated this when he told the House naively last Tuesday that while Khrushchov knows "he could not overcome the U.S. with the airplanes and missiles we have available," on the other hand "we could not know what the proper targets were or know where they would be unless we had some means of checking up on them—and he left us no course to pursue except the course that we did pursue." In other words, while Mr. K. dare not attack us, we can't attack him until we know where his bases are. If we had our missiles trained on his bases, we could be "tougher" at the bargaining table. Maybe the unwelcome signs are going up for Ike in Moscow because the Russians fear it is we who may be planning a Pearl Harbor.

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